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Abstract 
Presuppositions and the challenge to objectivity in late-
modern philosophy of science: causes and possible remedies 
The history of late-modern philosophy of science introduces us 
to a growing emphasis on presuppositions accompanied by a 
growing relativistic attitude concerning the possibility of scien-
tific objectivity. Aspects of the latter historical developments are 
traced in some of the most important philosophers of science of 
the 20th century. An analysis of the possible causes of the 
phenomenon is also provided. The predominance of the free-
dom-pole of the humanist ground motive requires a conception 
of science in which the creative presuppositions of the knowing 
agent play an increasingly crucial role. Two “remedies” for a 
more balanced understanding of the role of presuppositions are 
indicated. The first one has to do with the recognition of a broad 
variety of ideological standpoints, stemming from different reli-
gious commitments. The second one recommends the recog-
nition of the universal order for reality, which implies two con-
sequences. First, our presuppositions do not have the power of 
determining our scientific observations of reality completely. 
Second, scientific research does not proceed only according to 
our presuppositional frameworks but follows a structural order. 
A few reflections on the nature of scientific objectivity conclude 
the article. 
Presuppositions and the challenge to objectivity in late-modern philosophy ...  
Opsomming 
Vooronderstellings en die uitdaging daarvan aan objektiwiteit 
in die laat-moderne wetenskapsfilosofie: oorsake en 
moontlike oplossings 
Die geskiedenis van die laat-moderne wetenskapsfilosofie word 
gekenmerk deur die groeiende klem op vooronderstellings wat 
hand aan hand gaan met ’n groeiende relatiwistiese houding 
ten opsigte van die moontlikheid van wetenskaplike objektiwi-
teit. Aspekte van laasgenoemde historiese ontwikkeling word in 
sommige van die belangrikste wetenskapsfilosowe van die 
twintigste eeu nagespeur. ’n Analise van die moontlike oorsake 
van die verskynsel word ook gegee. Die sterk posisie van die 
vryheidspool van die humanistiese grondmotief vereis ’n weten-
skapskonsepsie waarin die skeppende voorwaardes van die 
kennende agent ’n toenemend deurslaggewende rol speel. 
Twee “geneesmiddels” vir ’n meer gebalanseerde verstaan van 
die rol van vooronderstellings word aangedui. Die eerste een 
het te make met die erkenning van ’n breë verskeidenheid 
ideologiese standpunte wat voortspruit uit verskillende religieu-
se verbintenisse. Die tweede een stel voor dat ’n universele 
orde vir die werklikheid erken word, wat twee konsekwensies 
veronderstel. Eerstens, ons vooronderstellings het nie die ver-
moë om ons wetenskaplike waarnemings van die werklikheid 
volkome te determineer nie. Tweedens, wetenskaplike navor-
sing volg nie net ons vooronderstellingsraamwerke nie, maar 
volg ’n strukturele orde. Die artikel sluit af met ’n aantal op-
merkings oor die aard van wetenskaplike objektiwiteit. 
1. Introduction  
The recognition of the role of presuppositions in science is perhaps 
the most significant feature of the philosophy of science of the 20th 
century. I will use the term presuppositions (without other qualifi-
cations) to indicate generically all kinds of non-scientific or pre-
theoretical assumptions, beliefs, worldviews which might be related 
to science. The received view insisted on the objectivity of science, 
which meant the exclusion of all non-scientific and metaphysical 
elements from scientific research itself (Botha, 1988:40 ff.). But the 
growing awareness of the role played by frameworks, paradigms 
and interpretation in general, in the long run imposed a much more 
modest view of the objectivity and rationality of science. In some 
cases scientific objectivity was challenged and even endangered. By 
tracing these developments in contemporary philosophy of science it 
will become apparent, I believe, that relativism and loss of con-
fidence about objectivity gradually increased in the late-modern 
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era.1 The main question addressed here is: what are the causes of 
this phenomenon? After tackling this question, this article offers a 
few suggestions to improve our understanding of the nature and role 
of presuppositions and to counteract the relativism of contemporary 
philosophy of science.  
My historical analysis will pass through the works of Popper, 
Polanyi, Kuhn and Feyerabend.2 By beginning my analysis from 
Popper I would like to explore briefly a philosophical system that is 
not fully implicated in the relativism of late-modern philosophy and 
for this reason constitutes a kind of background to more recent (and 
radical) developments.  
2. Popper: opening the door to presuppositions 
In a rather direct dialogue with Kuhn, Popper (1970:51) claims that 
the whole idea of paradigms influencing the scientific research was 
anticipated by himself already in 1934, in the preface to his book 
The logic of scientific discovery. Popper does not use the term 
paradigm, of course, but he goes as far as admitting that “we ap-
proach everything in the light of a preconceived theory” (Popper, 
1970:52). Popper’s idea of a “framework”, however, is by no means 
as demanding as Kuhn’s notion of paradigm: it does not impose 
itself on generations of scientists, demanding a committed loyalty. It 
does not resist the advent of a new paradigm. It does not prescribe 
problems, methods, theories and even instruments. It does not 
affect the scientist to the extent that the latter can only practice 
science from “within” a given paradigm. 
                                      
1 I prefer to use the term “late-modern” (instead of “postmodern”) because the 
former implies a closer connection between modernity and postmodernity. 
Postmodernity is not situated “after” modernity but in many ways is rather to be 
considered as part of it (cf. Coletto, 2007:16-17). For example, the analysis of 
several artistic disciplines brings Chabot (1991:35-38) to the conclusion that 
only in some of these disciplines modernity is opposed, while in others it is 
continued, re-affirmed and so on. 
2 The choice of these thinkers is due to the fact that they deal specifically with 
philosophy of science, they are (among) the most influential philosophers of 
science of the period in question and their philosophies are good examples of 
the themes I intend to substantiate. By proposing these authors, however, I am 
not ignoring that in the same period others have resisted the growing scepticism 
towards objectivity. One can mention for example those who supported realist 
tendencies (e.g. Boyd, 1983; Mc Mullin, 1991) or rationalist tendencies (Newton-
Smith, 1981). Even positivism is not totally absent from the picture. It will be 
admitted, however, that counter-instances like these are clearly less influential 
and authoritative than the mainstream schools in philosophy of science. 
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Yes, we are “caught up” in paradigms, admits Popper, but we are 
free to leave them at any time. Yes, we then have to enter a new 
paradigm, grants Popper. But it will then always be “a better and 
roomier one” (Popper, 1970:56). Paradigms can always be critically 
discussed and compared (Popper, 1970:57). The dramatic picture 
offered by Kuhn is therefore dubbed by Popper (1970:56) as “the 
myth of the framework”.  
Apart from frameworks, for Popper there are also “extra scientific 
beliefs (such as a faith in the power of critical discussion) which a 
scientist need accept” (Popper, 1963:107). Such presuppositions 
grant the progress of science and allow the scientific practice itself. 
They are non-negotiable and should be held in common by all 
scientists. Unfortunately, Popper does not articulate this argument 
thoroughly. 
Popper’s discussion of philosophical issues is far more elaborated, 
although there is a certain degree of ambiguity in his attitude to-
wards “metaphysics”. On the one hand, as Stafleu (1987:253) ob-
serves, it is clear that Popper has his own ontological preferences. 
For example, he has convictions concerning the importance of the 
hypothetical-deductive method, about logic, realism, objective truth, 
the existence of natural laws (which are inborn but independent of 
humankind) and so on. Popper argues with vigour in favour of his 
metaphysical convictions. On the other hand Popper often seems to 
shy away from “metaphysical” issues, as if they might be potentially 
dangerous or “bewitching”. On this point I agree with Botha (1986: 
436-438) on the necessity of a second criterion of demarcation, to 
distinguish between “good and bad” metaphysics. 
It might be concluded that Popper attributed a rather limited role to 
presuppositions. Yet his position represented an important break-
through, compared to the positivist point of view. In Popper’s philo-
sophy the role of expectations and frameworks at least started to be 
mentioned in a positive way. They were no longer something that 
should be simply kept out of science.  
The human subject was not seen anymore as a neutral observer 
collecting facts that speak by themselves. Popper argued that crea-
tivity and imagination are essential to propose scientific theories. 
Sometimes good scientific ideas can even initially be suggested by 
“stories” which are not really different from myths. The difference is 
that the “scientific myths” undergo open and informed criticism 
(Popper, 1963:127). Although Popper cannot be called a subjec-
tivist, he recognised a more active role to the subject of knowledge. 
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Polanyi continued Popper’s journey and reached a more relativist 
position. 
3. Polanyi: recognising and classifying presuppositions 
In this section I’m going to focus mainly on the initial phases of 
Polanyi’s philosophy, as illustrated in his work Science faith and 
society (Polanyi, 1946).3 At that stage, Polanyi (1946:42) dis-
tinguishes two classes of presuppositions: general and particular 
assumptions, though the distinction is not very systematic or even 
precise. In addition he sometimes speaks of “ideals” (Polanyi, 1946: 
71) that look mainly like moral values.  
Now, all the ideals, beliefs or presuppositions indicated above, are 
to a large extent shared by all scientists, irrespective of their faith 
and other commitments. At this stage of his career, this is an 
essential element in Polanyi’s thought: presuppositions exist and 
play a role, they influence science and even make it possible. But 
most importantly, they are the common property of all scientists. 
They do not divide the scientific community. On the contrary, they 
unite it (Polanyi, 1946:55-56). 
Polanyi also admits, however, that some presuppositions do create 
differences among scientists. The three types of premises men-
tioned above are pre-scientific in nature, but there are “ultimate pre-
suppositions” (Polanyi, 1946:85) that belong to the scientific level.4 
                                      
3 Polanyi’s recognition of a broader influence of presuppositions in Personal 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1958) is not very different in its basic structure, from what 
Kuhn proposes. However, as these insights are more articulated in Kuhn’s work, 
I will rather describe these new developments in the next section, dedicated to 
Kuhn. 
4 At the very beginning of my introduction I have stated that my focus will be on 
the role of pre-scientific presuppositions. The reason is that the influence of 
scientific presuppositions (e.g. theorems, axioms) on science has seldom been 
a matter of dispute among philosophers. Occasionally, however, in this article I 
also refer to the role of scientific presuppositions in Polanyi and Kuhn because it 
integrates their discourses on presuppositions. Of course different philosophers 
classify presuppositions differently and draw differently the line between 
scientific and pre-scientific presuppositions. For some, for example, philo-
sophical presuppositions are scientific (Dooyeweerd), while for others (e.g. Pop-
per) they are pre-scientific. Though the criterion for demarcation is too complex 
to be properly discussed in this article, I suggest that the nature of a 
presupposition is strongly determined by the context/attitude in which it is ela-
borated. For example, a belief that is accepted or shaped in the context of 
religious commitment belongs to the level of pre-scientific presuppositions or 
ground motives. On the other hand, presuppositions that are shaped in the 
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In this context Polanyi (1946:88) mentions for example mechanism, 
rationalism and empiricism and observes that their proponents did 
not just regard them as complementary to each other. This raises a 
question: do they not constitute a threat to the unity and objectivity 
of the scientific community? Polanyi insists: although the “ultimate 
presuppositions” adopted by scientists are different, they are “funda-
mentally based on common ground” (Polanyi, 1946:85).   
If we compare it with Popper’s position, Polanyi’s view represents an 
important step forward in many respects. In his work the premises of 
science are taken seriously and explored. It is understood that these 
premises have an influence on the scientific process. Certain (scien-
tific) presuppositions are shared only by a particular community, or 
in a certain epoch (e.g. the premises behind classical physics). Yet 
most of the premises are shared by all scientists (nobody can 
practice science, for example, without believing in its value).  
These are not Popper’s presuppositions, which can be abandoned 
at any moment with the help of rational criticism. According to Po-
lanyi (1946:90-92), for example, ultimate presuppositions direct even 
our criticism, our experiments, our tests. All this creates a distance 
between Polanyi and Popper and brings Polanyi closer to Kuhn’s 
idea of paradigms. But presuppositions in general, in Polanyi’s 
system, do not threaten science or communication because they are 
held in common, to a large extent, by all scientists. Polanyi links the 
presuppositions to the scientific tradition and community, thus grant-
ing science the possibility of dialogue and to retain a considerable 
authority and legitimacy. 
In addition, Polanyi’s presuppositions reach “deeper” levels than in 
Kuhn: they point towards the area of personal belief. Polanyi comes 
very close to the notion of religious ground motive, which was in-
dicated as the root of scientific thought in the neo-calvinist tradition 
(see section 6). In fact, in his view scientific presuppositions are 
grounded into pre-scientific premises and these are linked to our 
deepest commitments. They refer to a “spiritual reality”, to “spiritual 
resources”, to an “act of devotion”, and to “faith” (Polanyi, 1946:15, 
54, 55, 76).  
                                                                                                              
context of theoretical reflection are scientific in nature. Further suggestions 
concerning the differences and similarities between scientific and pre-scientific 
presuppositions are sketched by Coletto (2007:18-19). 
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In Science faith and society Polanyi (1946) follows a rather “conser-
vative” line, characterised by a defense of scientific unity, authority 
and tradition. In Personal knowledge (1958) he attempts acknow-
ledging to a larger extent the conflicts created by different premises. 
But in order to learn more on this topic we can turn to Thomas Kuhn. 
In his work, the radical fractures created by paradigm changes are 
recognised and dealt with in a more articulated way. 
4. Kuhn: the paradigm as presuppositional framework 
In The structure of scientific revolutions (from now on The structure) 
a presuppositional framework is finally recognised as the cause of 
substantial differences in the practice of (both normal and revolu-
tionary) science. My main argument in this respect is that Kuhn, by 
introducing the paradigm concept, has recognised a broader role 
and influence of presuppositions. Though the paradigm contains not 
only pre-scientific presuppositions, Kuhn’s notion of paradigm al-
ways includes pre-scientific elements. It can therefore be granted 
that whenever Kuhn acknowledges any influence of paradigms or 
matrixes on science, it is to a considerable extent the influence of 
pre-scientific elements, which are inseparable from the scientific 
components of the paradigm. 
Given the many and complex changes introduced by Kuhn in his 
view of paradigms, it would be very demanding to comment on his 
philosophy by following its historical development step by step. In 
addition, such an effort would not be particularly fruitful. I will rather 
try to individuate a few characteristics of Kuhn’s idea of a paradigm 
(later matrix and exemplar) that are sufficiently stable through the 
changes. On this basis, I will try to compare Kuhn’s position with the 
views of his predecessors, in particular Popper and Polanyi.  
For example, paradigms (but also matrixes and exemplars) while 
accounting for the consensus of a certain scientific community5 also 
make more room for the recognition of dissensus than in the past. 
On the one hand paradigms create differences only between 
different scientific epochs, not within the same epoch. In this sense, 
Kuhn’s view is not totally different from Polanyi’s: under the same 
paradigm, a discipline is granted the necessary homogeneity.  
                                      
5 According to Hoyningen-Huene (1993:132 ff.) the initial reason why Kuhn 
introduced the idea of a paradigm is that it was supposed to account for the 
consensus existing within a scientific community. 
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On the other hand, in The structure the successive paradigms con-
tradict each other to a large extent. This is due to the fact that each 
new paradigm is supposed to solve problems which were not 
solvable under the previous paradigm (Kuhn, 1970a:92). The old 
paradigm is not simply modified, it is substituted by a new one which 
is supposed to provide the means to solve the crisis. For Kuhn, in 
fact, the new paradigm is at least antagonistic to the one which is 
substituted. This introduces the idea of (theoretical) antithesis, which 
is a new and important idea provided by Kuhn. 
Secondly, paradigms (and their subsequent elaborations) change 
the world they constitute or help constituting. Since The structure 
Kuhn introduced the idea that paradigms are “constitutive of nature” 
(Kuhn, 1970a:110). They are part of that phenomenal world which is 
accessible to a specific community. Now, neither Popper nor Polanyi 
would ever have pushed the role of presuppositions thus far. For 
Polanyi the world is one and the truth is one, although the com-
plexities of both require a great deal of openness and humbleness 
from the scientist. But for Kuhn paradigms become part of the 
phenomenal world that we explore scientifically. This is a world that 
we constitute and because we hold to different paradigms we con-
stitute a plurality of phenomenal worlds. In this sense then, the 
weight of paradigms and their subsequent elaborations is much 
heavier than previous forms of presuppositions recognised by pre-
vious philosophers of science.  
Thirdly, paradigms and all their subsequent elaborations determine 
science to an extremely large extent. As they are constitutive of the 
world, they constitute science even more. In The structure para-
digms determine both the form and the content of scientific re-
search, the problems, the questions, the methods, the instruments, 
the solutions! But even exemplars shape and determine the con-
victions and the results of the scientific community. They are not for-
mal rules, they are rather learned by paradigmatic examples and 
“ostensions”. But their effects are still very similar to those of para-
digms: they determine scientific research to a large extent. Exem-
plars determine the similarity relations that are at the basis of our 
way of exploring the world (Kuhn, 1974:482).  
All these considerations bring us to the conclusion that in Kuhn’s 
philosophy the role of presuppositions in the shaping of scientific 
research was recognised more than in the past. At the same time, 
unfortunately, the objects of knowledge seem to play a more limited 
role. Kuhn tried to avoid complete relativism, but had to admit at 
least that his philosophy promotes “partial relativism” (Kuhn, 1970b: 
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264-265). He was aware of the threat of complete anarchism and 
tried to protect the reliability of science from it. Feyerabend, on the 
other hand, saw anarchism as a wonderful opportunity, leading 
towards a better conception of science. 
5. Feyerabend: science as a presuppositional system 
Although Feyerabend provided some sort of demarcation criterion, 
in a context of high academic discussion, he did not believe in a real 
separation between scientific and non-scientific, between science 
and life (Feyerabend, 1975:19). He complains, for example, that a 
rigid demarcation is introduced between sciences: physics is dis-
tinguished from theology and from philosophy (Feyerabend, 1975: 
19). Then science is distinguished from life and from belief. Accord-
ing to Feyerabend it is not understood that science is also a belief, a 
demanding practice perhaps, but still a belief that cannot be com-
pletely justified. 
Feyerabend considers science as a belief system, while he can also 
speak of the “scientific content of some myths” (Feyerabend, 1975: 
49, footnote 7). The belief in science should be treated as any other 
belief. There are other options available: one could prefer to believe 
in voodoo or some ancient myth. Science should not be compulsory 
for our education and there should be a “separation of state and 
science” (Feyerabend, 1975:301), as the state has already separa-
ted itself from any specific church or religion (Feyerabend, 1978: 
106). 
In his work there remains a sense in which myth and scientific 
elaborations can be distinguished. Scientific elaborations can be 
seen as articulations of a basic myth. Some myths are elaborated in-
to all types of theories. Others are never elaborated, although the 
possibility remains always available. In any case, science is not 
more rational than other activities. Its supposed objectivity and ra-
tionality are unmasked as pretensions the moment we analyse the 
concrete ways in which science has progressed through history. 
These ways do not exclude ad hoc adjustments, propaganda and so 
forth. Science is like any other human affair: it progresses irratio-
nally, it needs to resist common sense and to proceed counter-
inductively.  
Our exploration has thus moved from a time (the positivist era) when 
presuppositions were excluded from science, to a time when some 
philosophers suppose that science itself becomes a kind of belief. 
Or at least, it is not very clear what distinguishes science from its 
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presuppositions. It might be argued that Feyerabend’s anarchist 
philosophy is a rather peculiar point to conclude our exploration. Ad-
mittedly, our historical analysis could be extended to more recent 
times and to more moderate positions. Yet even in that case it would 
not yield significantly different results. Generally speaking, the know-
ing agent/community (and his/its presuppositions) is still the main 
focus of our philosophies of science, while the notion of objectivity is 
gradually weakened. It is therefore time to conclude this historical 
journey and to try and interpret the “symptoms” that have been 
observed. 
6. Attempting a diagnosis 
6.1 From nature to freedom 
Dooyeweerd’s theory of religious motives remains, I believe, one of 
the most suggestive ways of looking at the developments described 
up to now. Dooyeweerd could not write very much on the philo-
sophers of science mentioned above (he died in 1977). Yet he pro-
vided a framework for the understanding of humanistic thought, 
including philosophy of science. In his view humanist thought, like all 
theoretical achievements, is regulated by a religious ground motive, 
a spiritual motive directing culture in a humanistic direction.6
This humanist religious ground motive is constituted by two poles: 
the pole of nature and the pole of freedom, which are in dialectical 
tension (Dooyeweerd, 1984, 1:190-495). The pole of nature is domi-
nated by the ideal of science, implying the scientific control of nature 
by man. The motive of nature, aiming at the control of nature, soon 
came into conflict with the pole of freedom. In fact, control over 
nature also means control over the human being, who is after all 
part of nature. Once rigid control is exercised over all nature, there is 
no more space for human freedom (Dooyeweerd, 1979:152-153). 
The conflict can be illustrated as follows. The motive of autonomous 
                                      
6 From a reformational point of view the term religion/ous does not necessarily 
refer only to “classical” religions like Christianity or Islam. It includes also the 
convictions of humanists, atheists, positivists, marxists and all those who 
“interpret” life in some way or the other (i.e. all human beings). Roy Clouser 
observes that “a belief is religious provided that (1) it is a belief in something(s) 
or other as divine or (2) a belief concerning how humans come to stand in 
proper relation to the divine”. As Clouser (1991:22-23) defines divine as “having 
the status of not depending on anything else”, it is clear that all human beings 
have “religious” beliefs about some “ultimate” reality (e.g. matter, rationality, et 
cetera). 
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and creative freedom of the human person is incompatible with the 
acceptance of an order of nature, constraining human freedom and 
revealing its heteronomous character. But the motive of nature, pro-
moting the idea of the dominion of nature through science, requires 
a deterministic and mechanistic conception of the world, which 
leaves no room for the free and autonomous human subject. In 
Dooyeweerd’s words therefore, “nature is revealed as the relentless 
enemy of freedom” (Dooyeweerd, 1959:52; translation – RC). 
It is not possible to find a synthesis or a reconciliation between the 
two opposite poles of the same humanistic ground motive.7 The 
inevitable outcome, according to Dooyeweerd, is to attribute the 
primacy to one of the two and simultaneously depreciate the other. 
But the depreciated pole, usually, in due time finds a way to regain 
the primacy and to overcome the opposing pole. The reason is that 
the world is an integral and coherent reality, which resists the ab-
solutisation of one aspect to the detriment of the others. Declaring 
one dimension of reality as primary, inevitably leads to a tension in 
which the other dimensions call for recognition. In sociology for 
example, initially humanism was directed (by the pole of nature) 
towards the absolutisation of the method of the natural sciences. 
When it became clear that this was gradually eliminating human 
freedom from the scene, the ideal of freedom regained strength and 
imposed the absolutisation of the “historical method” (Dooyeweerd, 
1979:207). 
Historicism8 viewed all of reality from the perspective of historical 
development. Just like human culture, also the planets, plants and 
animals were products of development. This seemed to suit better 
and to strengthen the ideal of the free personality, which is closely 
linked to the freedom-pole of the humanistic ground motive, and 
dialectically opposed to the ideal of science of the nature motive. 
The ideal of the free personality, previously “defeated” by the ideal 
of science, gradually started to claim its rights. The mechanistic 
world picture of the previous phase was abandoned in favour of an 
organismic worldview. The natural scientist used to divide a complex 
                                      
7 A religious dialectics, according to Dooyeweerd (1984, 1:64-65), cannot be 
solved by way of theoretical synthesis. 
8 Basically, we can say that Dooyeweerd uses the term historicism to indicate 
relativism, i.e. as the result of anchoring philosophy to the pole of the auto-
nomous personality (i.e. to the human subject). Admittedly, this is a rather 
unique use of the term. 
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phenomenon into its simplest elements. The new method took its 
departure from the individual whole, and tried to understand the 
function of the parts in terms of the whole. In the next section we will 
observe more in detail the effects of the ideal of freedom on philo-
sophy of science and more in particular on the role of frameworks 
and presuppositions. 
6.2 Presuppositions and the ideal of freedom 
At this point we can focus on the basic conflict within the humanistic 
ground motive. On the one side we have the control of nature 
through science. On the other we have the freedom of the per-
sonality. The first ideal stresses science, the second one freedom. 
The first stresses nature, the second man and his creativity. It is 
enough to keep in mind these basic facts, in order to approach the 
problems discussed so far from a new perspective. We have ob-
served a rather limited segment, historically speaking, of the deve-
lopment of humanistic philosophy of science. Yet it appears likely to 
suppose that positivism was inspired by the theme of the control of 
nature via natural science. Great importance was attributed to 
nature itself. The intervention of the human personality was expe-
rienced as an intrusion. The role of the scientist was reduced to a 
minimum and characterised by objectivity and neutrality. Facts were 
supposed to speak for themselves, while the subjectivity of the 
scientist (which includes his religious and metaphysical presupposi-
tions) was ruled out of bounds. 
Popper’s philosophy inaugurated a transitional phase. He tried to 
create a synthesis between the two poles of the humanistic motive 
(cf. Stafleu, 1987:255-256). He was trying to save both scientific 
control and human creativity, but was still rather ambiguous about 
the role of presuppositions (see section 3). With Kuhn, the emphasis 
falls more directly on human creativity. The importance of history 
emerges with new force. The observer creates a new world by his 
own way of seeing. Paradigms, the ultimate foundations of science, 
become the central notion of a new understanding of science. With 
Feyerabend we see the triumph of the free personality, unrestrained 
by any heteronomy. 
We are now able to provide a possible answer to the general ques-
tion concerning the causes of the objectivity crisis in late-modern 
philosophy of science. The depreciation of the ideal of science and 
the hegemony of the ideal of freedom of the autonomous personality 
demand a new conception of science where objectivity and ratio-
nality are gradually downplayed. They demand a science in which 
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presuppositions play a larger role, a science which does not impose 
its conclusions. But with the radical reduction of objectivity, authority 
and universal validity, the legitimacy of science is also gradually 
endangered.  
On the basis of this “diagnosis”, I will propose two suggestions. The 
first one (section 7.1) is meant to improve an understanding of the 
role and nature of presuppositions, the second one (section 7.2) 
aims at balancing the excessive emphasis on presuppositions. 
7. Sketching two suggestions 
7.1 Recognising the religious commitments and the 
consequent ideological plurality 
My first suggestion is not about relativising the role of presupposi-
tions in science. On the contrary, it is about recognising that pre-
suppositions are always related to the religious root of theoretical 
thinking. A corollary of this suggestion is that we also need to 
recognise without hesitations the broad confessional or ideological 
plurality of presuppositions (e.g. christian, humanist, positivist, prag-
matist and so on).9
In some recent philosophies of science the point of contact between 
theoretical thought and the religious or worldviewish root in the 
human person has not been acknowledged. We are left with hypo-
theses or “expectations” which can be abandoned at any time 
(Popper), or with paradigms in which the role of the deepest presup-
positions is insufficiently explored (Kuhn).  
Some authors were closer to the discovery of the religious root of 
thinking. Polanyi speaks of beliefs behind our theories, of faith and 
“spiritual resources”. Unfortunately this important insight is not al-
ways accompanied by a recognition of a plurality of confessional 
standpoints. Polanyi’s emphasis (especially in the first phases of his 
                                      
9 The space at my disposal is not sufficient to discuss the necessity of re-
cognising a broader typological variety of presuppositions as well (i.e. there are 
many types of presuppositions). On this topic reformational philosophers have 
provided numerous contributions. I will only mention for example Wolters’ 
(1989:21 ff.) discussion of the different roles played by worldviews and religious 
ground motives. See also Klapwijk (1987 and 1989), Olthuis (1989), Wolterstorff 
(1989), Botha (1993 and 2002, especially p. 210-216). A short but very 
interesting contribution on this topic has been provided by Duvenage (1985). 
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career) is rather on the unity of the scientific community and the 
common ground created by the same ideals.  
In general, the humanist tradition has been ready to explore the 
influences that a large variety of factors have on science. Psycho-
logical factors, social, economic, cultural factors have been shown to 
have a meaningful influence. But the eventual influence of the reli-
gious dimension has been kept out of the picture. Botha (1994:27) 
has expressed the hope that a certain trend within contemporary 
philosophy of science (the cognitive-historical school of among 
others N.J. Nersessian) might “provide interesting new perspectives 
(...) in which the role of religious factors is not excluded”. But for the 
moment this seems to remain just a hope. 
Dooyeweerd’s (1984, 1:3-67) transcendental critique of theoretical 
thinking was a decisive step in the recognition of the link between 
science and religion, as well as the confessional plurality of presup-
positions. His critique allows to maintain that a plurality of religious 
motives are the basic pretheoretical starting points of philosophy 
and culture in general. They influence theoretical thinking by pro-
viding a triplex fundamental idea, which Dooyeweerd (1984, 1:68) 
calls a transcendental or ground idea. The first “side” of this idea 
provides an answer to the question concerning the origin of mean-
ing. The second side deals with the unity of meaning and the third 
one deals with the relation of coherence and diversity between the 
different aspects of created reality (Dooyeweerd 1984, 1:93-102).  
The three questions are interrelated. According to Dooyeweerd 
(1984, 1:69), the acceptance of a unique origin of all meaning (or of 
two original principles opposed to each other) determines whether 
one accepts or not (see second question) the integral unity of 
meaning at the root of the modal aspects. And the answer given to 
this second question determines how one understands the mutual 
relation and coherence of meaning of the modal aspects (third 
question). All this influences philosophical thinking. However, the 
special sciences rely on philosophy for their theoretical conception 
of reality and for their method of forming concepts and problems. 
The specific meaning of analogical concepts is different between 
different sciences because their modal points of view differ and their 
basic ground idea differs. It is therefore clear that the triune 
transcendental idea, on the basis of a religious ground motive, 
influences both philosophy and the special sciences. 
A plurality of confessional commitments creates a plurality of pre-
suppositional frameworks which need to be recognised as well. 
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Though admitting that one “paradigm” may obtain the majority of 
consensus in a certain period, Dooyeweerd recognised more clearly 
than Kuhn that it is possible that different schools coexist and 
interact in the same period, without necessarily adopting the same 
“paradigm”. In this sense Dooyeweerd would have agreed with 
Feyerabend, who noticed this phenomenon for example during the 
nineteenth century, in physics (Feyerabend, 1970:207-208). Unlike 
Feyerabend (e.g. 1975:30), however, Dooyeweerd did never main-
tain that the proliferation of frameworks and theories should 
constitute an appropriate aim of science. 
A better understanding of confessional plurality would help obtaining 
a better assessment of the nature and role of presuppositions. It 
would not be sufficient in itself, however, to heal the widespread 
philosophical skepticism concerning scientific objectivity. On the 
contrary, it might even deepen the relativist mood of contemporary 
philosophy of science. To avoid this undesired result, the recognition 
of the plurality of confessional standpoints must be accompanied by 
the recognition of creational structures. My second suggestion, 
therefore, deals with the recognition of a universal and structural 
order for reality. 
7.2 Recovering the real world 
Reformational philosophers have never abandoned the idea that, 
apart from our frameworks, there must be some type of real world 
out there, a reality which is not influenced by our views. And as we 
human beings are part of this created reality, the latter must be 
accessible to our enquiries, to a considerable extent. Here we meet 
the fundamental theme of a creational order, so characteristic of the 
reformational approach. As I have dealt more extensively with this 
topic in another article10 I will limit myself to a few notes here. I 
would define this structural order as a stable and universal order, 
accessible to the knower and conditioning scientific thought.  
The created order is not simply constructed by the subject. It cannot 
be “boxed” into just any view or theory. It is not just what we want it 
to be. But at the same time it is accessible to scientific investigation. 
One of the consequences of this basic insight is that our theories do 
not have the power of shaping or determining our scientific obser-
vations of reality completely. Reality is to a certain extent indepen-
                                      
10 See R. Coletto: The “eclipse” of the object of research in late-modern philoso-
phy of science. (Forthcoming: Tydskrif vir Christelike wetenskap, 44(1-2) 2008.) 
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dent from our theories and frameworks. Stafleu (1987:125) offers a 
good summary of this important theme when he says:  
Some logical-empiricists thought (…) that the observational 
results, the ‘sense data’, are completely independent of any 
theory. But this view seems to be untenable. Some modern 
philosophers tend to adhere to the other extreme by assuming 
that any observational result is completely determined by a 
theory. An intermediate position seems to be more in accord 
with scientific practice. We argued that observational results 
can only be acquired in a theoretical context, but nevertheless 
have a certain autonomy (…) They can be transferred from one 
theory to another one. If this were not the case theories could 
not be tested and competing theories could not be compared. 
Accepting the existence of a universal structural order has another 
important consequence: science does not develop primarily in ac-
cordance with our own frameworks, but in accordance with the clues 
provided by the created order. In this context Stafleu (1987:151-157) 
suggests an explanatory model accounting for the empirically dis-
covered natural order (cf. Stafleu, 1987:157).  
In this model, three fundamental “axes” of scientific research are 
identified. They are linked to ontological distinctions such as the 
theory of modal aspects, the distinction universal-typical and the dis-
tinction between the law side and the subject side of reality. These 
axes of research allow the fourfold scientific search for objectivity, 
application, universality and structure. This shows that scientific 
research does not proceed in a chaotic manner, but rather follows a 
natural order. In the past few decades, several philosophers have 
argued that science develops under the guidance of a paradigm 
(Kuhn), a research programme (Lakatos, 1970:91-196) or a re-
search tradition (Laudan, 1977:70-120). They have shown the in-
timate relation between a worldview (or framework) and scientific 
work. But, as Stafleu observes: “none of them has recognized the 
natural order of these various directions of scientific research” 
(Stafleu, 1987:157).  
Unfortunately, the late-modern philosophy of science has very often 
been nominalist and subjectivist, and therefore has been inclined to 
deny any order external to the subject. This has caused several 
anomalies. In particular, the denial of an order external to the 
subject has gradually contributed to placing the locus ordinis within 
the subject himself. In this way the presuppositions of the knowing 
subject, his theories and views, have increasingly acquired an 
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extraordinary importance to the detriment of another fundamental 
epistemic factor: the universal order for creation.  
The reformational tradition recognises to a larger extent the reality of 
both presuppositions and conditioning structures. It does so, not by 
searching a fine balance between the two but by placing them into a 
new context. This context is the Biblical view of the world, in which 
the human subject is a religious being and the world is a creation 
including man himself. In this perspective, the different subjects and 
objects are not autonomous but are subjected to a “Law” or laws. 
The law does not constitute an inhibition of the freedom of the 
subject but rather constitutes the possibility itself of this freedom. 
8. Conclusion 
The recognition of a created order provides the needed external 
anchorage for scientific knowledge. The admission that presup-
positions are not all that exists in science and we are constrained by 
a created order partially independent of knowing agents, counteracts 
relativism and provides a more balanced picture of the scientific 
enterprise. When this order is acknowledged, the recognition of the 
ultimate religious root of presuppositions is not necessarily to be 
considered a threat to scientific objectivity. But it is inappropriate to 
emphasise the role of presuppositions to the detriment of the struc-
tural order that the different sciences are supposed to investigate. 
Late-modern philosophy did something positive when rejecting the 
notion of objectivity promoted under the “received view” of science. 
Objectivity should not be understood as correspondence to the 
facts. Theories are underdetermined by facts and facts are selected 
in a way that makes them at least partially theory-laden. But then 
objectivity cannot be interpreted as correspondence to the knowing 
subject either. The notion of objectivity that should be defended is 
correspondence to the law, or law-conformity. According to Stafleu 
(1987:241) it was precisely this type of respectful “submission” to the 
law that guided (for example) Kepler to the acknowledgment of laws 
that contradicted all hypotheses conceived up to 1600.11 And it is 
this type of search for objectivity that can allow us to avoid the 
relativistic tendencies of postmodern philosophy of science. 
                                      
11 For an assessment of the relevance of the “Reformed view of the law” for 
modern science, see Stafleu (1987:239 ff.). 
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